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ABSTRACT.  Willingness to pay (WTP) elicitations suffer from various methodological problems. This 
paper tests a recently proposed alternative approach to value WTP for health, making use of trade-offs 
between income and lifetime or quality of life. We apply three experimental elicitation procedures and 
analyze the responses under an additive and a multiplicative utility function over health and income. 
We report several interesting results. First, the data are highly skewed, but if we trim the 5% lowest 
and highest values, we obtain plausible WTP estimates. Second, the results differ considerably 
between procedures, indicating that WTP estimates are sensitive to the assumed utility function. 
Third, respondents appear to be loss averse for both health and money, which is consistent with 
assumptions from prospect theory. Finally, our results also indicate that respondents are more willing 
to trade quality of life than life years.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Economic evaluations provide information on costs and effects of health technologies. Within 
economic evaluations, health effects are typically expressed in Quality Adjusted Life Years 
(QALYs). The QALY is a uniform outcome measure of health benefit that combines length 
of life with quality of life (QoL). By expressing health outcomes with a uniform measure, 
outcomes can be compared across different diseases and treatments, which can be helpful for 
decision makers in the process of making reimbursement decisions.  
While operating under budgetary constraints and pressure, advisory bodies, such as the 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE, 2008) in England and the 
National Health Care Institute (College Voor Zorgverzekeringen (Dutch board of insurers), 
2006) in the Netherlands, are in search for the shadow price of a QALY (Culyer et al., 2007). 
However, these two bodies use different shadow prices: NICE bases its shadow price upon 
forgone health (Claxton et al., 2010), whereas the Dutch National Health Care Institute bases 
it upon the consumption value of health (College Voor Zorgverzekeringen (Dutch board of 
insurers), 2006). 
In the first case, the value of health is determined by comparing the expected health gains 
of a health intervention to the health that is likely forgone elsewhere due to the displacement 
of activities within a fixed budget. This approach is also labelled as adopting a health care 
perspective, focussing only (or primarily) on costs to the health care sector and the health 
effects of an intervention. Cost-effectiveness analyses may suffice to prioritize healthcare in 
this case, operating under an exogenous budget constraint that is imposed by a higher 
authority (Claxton et al., 2010; 2011). In general, the decision rule then indicates that only 
when the health gained exceeds the health forgone, a new intervention should be adopted. It 
is not possible within this framework to judge whether the budget itself has been set 
appropriately.  
In the latter case, the value of health is determined by assessing the amount of 
consumption that individuals are willing to give up to improve health (Claxton et al., 2010). 
This approach may be related to adopting a societal perspective in performing economic 
evaluations, taking into account the broader societal costs and benefits of health 
interventions. Countries considering using this decision framework require a monetary 
estimate of the (consumption) value of health. The decision rule then becomes that the 
monetary value of the health (welfare gained) produced should exceed the monetary value of 
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the costs (welfare sacrificed). As long as this rule is followed in adopting and applying 
technologies, the appropriate budget follows from these decisions. In this paper we focus on 
the estimation of the consumption value of health and, hence, we seek to estimate the 
monetary value of a QALY (MVQ).  
Two kinds of willingness to pay (WTP) approaches have frequently been used to 
estimate the MVQ. The first approach has been to elicit the WTP for a reduction in the risk of 
death and then calculate the value of a life, from which the MVQ can be inferred (Abelson, 
2003; Hirth et al., 2000; Johannesson and Meltzer, 1998; Mason et al., 2009). The second 
approach has been to elicit the WTP for changes in health status directly (Bobinac et al., 
2010; 2014; Gyrd-Hansen, 2003; Johannesson and Johansson, 1997; Johnson et al., 1998; 
King et al., 2005; Lundberg et al., 1999; Pennington et al., 2013; Pinto-Prades et al., 2009; 
Robinson et al., 2013). 
However, the method of WTP has several known problems, including: insensitivity to 
scope (Bobinac et al., 2012; Olsen et al., 2004); strategic behaviour (Hackl and Pruckner, 
2005); the restriction of personal income or ‘ability to pay’ (O’Brien and Drummond, 1994); 
protest responses (Dalmau-Matarrodona, 2001); and dependence on the elicitation method 
(Frew et al., 2003), the payment vehicle (Hayes et al., 1992) as well as the order of the 
questions if more than one outcome is being valued (Stewart et al., 2002). Another 
shortcoming of most WTP elicitations is their inability to take account of reference-
dependency, which has often been demonstrated to play a considerable role in people’s 
decisions and valuations (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Moffett and Suarez-Almazor, 2005; 
Starmer, 2000; Treadwell and Lenert, 1999; van Exel et al., 2006). 
Recently, Tilling et al. (2014) suggested an alternative approach to estimate the MVQ, 
based upon a Time Trade Off (TTO) exercise. In that method, people are asked to choose 
between living longer (in some fixed health state) with less income and living shorter (in that 
same health state) with more income. Thus, a trade-off is made between length of life (in a 
particular health state) and income, which allows investigation of the implicit monetary value 
given to QALYs. Tilling et al. (2014) performed a first test of feasibility of this new approach 
and found that it may be possible to generate satisfactory WTP estimates, but they 
experienced a number of drawbacks. One of them was the need to specify a utility function 
over income, length of life and QoL. Tilling et al. (2014) estimated WTP assuming an 
additive lifetime utility function, which may be too restrictive (Domeij and Johannesson, 
2006; Finkelstein et al., 2013; Sloan et al., 1998; Viscusi and Evans, 1990). Therefore, in this 
paper we investigate this WTP-TTO approach more extensively in a representative sample of 
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the Dutch population, using a multiplicative utility function in the computation of WTP and 
allowing for reference-dependence and loss aversion. 
 
2. Methods 
 
Tilling et al. (2014) assumed an additive function W(.) over healthy life years (H) and income 
(Y): 
 
𝑊(𝐻, 𝑌) = 𝑈(𝐻) + 𝑌 (1) 
 
That is, individuals derive value from their lifetime and have a linear utility function over 
income. This specification was used earlier by Eeckhoudt et al. (1998). The advantage of this 
function is that it becomes straightforward to elicit a monetary value of the utility of perfect 
health. The pitfall is that it is descriptively less accurate. In particular, assuming this utility 
function implies independence of consumption utility from the level of health, which was one 
of the ‘impossibility theorem criteria’ set out by Dolan and Edlin (2002). Moreover, the 
empirical literature tends to reject this assumption in favour of a multiplicative utility 
function over health and income. Indeed, there is evidence that marginal utility of wealth 
increases with health and longevity, which is impossible under an additive function (Domeij 
and Johannesson, 2006; Finkelstein et al., 2013; Sloan et al., 1998; Viscusi and Evans, 
1990).1 Hence, we also study the following utility function over health and income: 
 
𝑊(𝐻, 𝑌) = 𝑈(𝐻) × 𝑉(𝑌) (2) 
 
 Bleichrodt and Quiggin (1999) have given the axiomatic foundations for this function. 
The simplest configuration would be to take both U(H) and V(Y) to be linear, but this is not 
very realistic. It is more likely that marginal utility decreases with income, i.e., Vˈ(Y)<0. 
Here, we model this by considering a power utility function 𝑉(𝑌) = 𝑌𝛼, with α as a measure 
of the utility curvature of income and 𝑉(𝑌) = ln⁡(𝑌) for α=0.  Therefore, our lifetime utility 
function will take the form: 
 
                                               
1 Tengstam (2014) instead found evidence that marginal utility of income is decreasing with health. 
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𝑊(𝐻, 𝑌) = 𝐻 × 𝑌𝛼 (3) 
 
Empirical support for this function was provided by Levy and Nir (2012). We take into 
account the possibility of health being less than perfect, by assuming the QALY model: 
H=Q×T, with T as the number of life years, and Q as the QoL on a cardinal scale with 0 
indicating a health state as bad as death and 10 indicating full health. 
 
2.1.TTO for income – classical approach 
 
The TTO for income method lets a subject compare a particular remaining lifetime T with 
some income level YA to another amount of remaining lifetime X with another income level 
YB. A possible scenario would be to assume T=10 years of life with QoL Q and annual 
income Y1 and to ask for the amount of remaining lifetime X which would render 
indifference in case the income level would increase to a higher level YB, while QoL remains 
stable at Q (TTO1). Under the multiplicative model (Eq. 3), this would result in the following 
equality: 
 
10 × 𝑄 × 𝑌A
𝛼 = 𝑋 × 𝑄 × 𝑌B
𝛼 (4) 
 
From this, we can compute an estimate of α: 
 
(
𝑌A
𝑌B
)
𝛼
=
𝑋
10
⇔𝛼 =
ln(10)−ln⁡(𝑋)
ln(𝑌B)−ln⁡(𝑌A)
 (5) 
 
with α>0. Having this estimate, we can continue to infer an estimate of the WTP for one year 
in full health (WTP[YFH]). For example, in case living 9 years with the higher income YB 
would give equal lifetime utility as the initial scenario with 10 years and income YA, both in 
full health (i.e., Q=10), the estimated value of α would be: 
 
10 × 10 × 𝑌A
𝛼 = 9 × 10 × 𝑌B
𝛼⇔𝑌B =⁡(
10
9
)
1/𝛼
× 𝑌A (6) 
 
WTP for a healthy life year is then given by the additional lifetime income people demand in 
return for reducing life by one year, corrected for their QoL: 
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𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝑌𝐹𝐻) =
(9𝑌9−10𝑌𝐴)
𝑄
=
(9(
10
9
)
1/𝛼
−10)𝑌𝐴
𝑄
 (7)
  
 
Alternatively, under the additive utility function (Eq. 1), the indifference above (with X=9 
and Q=10) will be evaluated by: 
 
10 × 10 ×𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝑌𝐹𝐻) + 10 × 𝑌A = 9 × 10 ×𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝑌𝐹𝐻) + 9 × 𝑌B (8) 
 
Solving Eq. 8 for WTP(YFH) yields: 
 
𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝑌𝐹𝐻) =
9×𝑌A−10×𝑌B
(10−9)×𝑄
=
9×𝑌A−10×𝑌B
𝑄
 (9) 
  
2.2. TTO for income – behavioural economic approach 
 
A large body of evidence has emerged suggesting that people deviate from several rationality 
assumptions underlying neoclassical economic theory. One such deviation is that individuals 
tend to behave according to prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1992; van Exel et al., 2006). In particular, they often form reference points and 
handle gains and losses as seen from this reference point differently. There is evidence that 
this behaviour also occurs in health-related decision making (Attema et al., 2013; Bleichrodt 
and Pinto, 2002; Bleichrodt et al., 2003). In order to accommodate this possibility, we 
analyse our data under this assumption from prospect theory as well.  
 Preferences become reference-dependent if we assume prospect theory, which 
requires separate formulations for gains and losses. In particular, we investigate reference-
dependency by the model proposed by Shalev (2002), which for income culminates into: 
 
𝑈(𝑌) = {
𝑢(𝑌)
𝑢(𝑌 − λ𝑀(𝑌0 − 𝑌))
 
if⁡𝑌≥𝑌0
if⁡𝑌<𝑌0
 (10) 
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With λ𝑀 a loss aversion index for monetary outcomes and Y0 the status quo. Although the 
utility function may be different for gains and losses, e.g. u(Y) = Yα for gains and u(Y) = -(-
Y)β losses, with α,β>0, for simplicity we assume they are the same. Extending this model to 
health yields: 
 
𝑈(𝐻) = {
𝑢(𝐻)
𝑢(𝐻 − λ𝐻(𝐻0 − 𝐻))
 
if⁡𝐻≥𝐻0
if⁡𝐻<𝐻0
 (11) 
 
with λ𝐻 a loss aversion index for health outcomes. 
 
In the next three sections (2.2.1 – 2.2.3) we describe the three experimental procedures that 
will be applied in this study and two hypotheses to be tested based on these procedures. 
 
2.2.1. TTO income gain and health loss  
 Suppose we apply TTO1 with T=10 years, Q=the respondent’s own current health 
state, YA=C and YB=L (with L>C), and we ask for the number of years X1 with income L 
rendering indifference. According to prospect theory, respondents then have to trade off a 
gain in income against a loss in lifetime. If we assume {T Years, YA} to be the reference 
point, this involves comparing the status quo against a mixed prospect, which would be 
evaluated by: 
 
10 × 𝑄 × 𝐶𝛼 = [𝑋1 − λ𝐻(10 − 𝑋1)] × 𝑄 × 𝐿
𝛼 (12) 
 
Solving this expression for X1 gives: 
 
𝑋1 =
10
1+λ𝐻
[λ𝐻 + (
𝐶
𝐿
)
𝛼
], (13) 
 
which is increasing in λ𝐻. Therefore X1 will be higher for people who are loss averse (λ𝐻>0) 
than for people who are loss neutral (λ𝐻=0). In the classical approach described in section 2.1 
loss aversion is ignored implicitly assuming λ𝐻=0. Consequently, the effect of loss aversion 
will be picked up by our estimate of α (Eq. 5), which is decreasing in X1 and, hence, will be 
lower if people are loss averse than if they are not. As derived in the Appendix, the real 
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estimate of α is given by 𝛼 =
𝑙𝑛(
𝑋1(1+𝜆𝐻)
10
+𝜆𝐻)
ln(𝐶)−ln⁡(𝐿)
, which requires knowledge of λ𝐻. Therefore, 
because our estimated α is decreasing in X1, and X1 increases with λ𝐻, the classical approach 
can be expected to generate an underestimation of the true α in case of loss aversion and, 
hence, an overestimation of WTP for a QALY (Eq. 7). 
 In case of the additive model, reference-dependence gives the following evaluation: 
 
10 × 𝑄 ×𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝑌𝐹𝐻) + 10 × 𝐶 = [𝑋1 − λ𝐻(10 − 𝑋1)] × 𝑄 ×𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝑌𝐹𝐻) + 𝑋1 × 𝐿 (14) 
 
Solving for X1 gives: 
 
𝑋1 =
10×[(𝑄×𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝑌𝐹𝐻))(1+λ𝐻)+𝐶]
(𝑄×𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝑌𝐹𝐻))(1+λ𝐻)+𝐿
, (15) 
 
which is again increasing in λ𝐻. Because WTP is increasing in X1 (Eq. 9), we again predict 
an overestimation of WTP for a QALY in case of loss aversion. 
 
2.2.2. TTO income loss and health loss  
 Now suppose we apply TTO1 with T=10 years and YB=L (with L>C), as in 2.2.1, but 
YA=S (with S<C), and ask for X2 which would render indifference in case the income level 
would increase to the present level C (TTO2). If we assume {T Years, YA} is still the 
reference point, the first option now entails a loss in income, whereas the second option still 
entails a loss in health. In other words, we are now comparing a loss in the monetary domain 
to a loss in the health domain. Indifference between the two options can then be evaluated by: 
 
10 × 𝑄 × [𝑆 − 𝜆𝑀(𝐶 − 𝑆)]
𝛼 = [𝑋2 − 𝜆𝐻(10 − 𝑋2)] × 𝑄 × 𝐶
𝛼, (16) 
 
which gives a different solution for X2 than we had for X1 in the first procedure (Eq. 15): 
 
𝑋2 = 10 [
(𝐶+λ𝑀(𝑆−𝐶))
𝛼−𝐶𝛼
λ𝐻𝐶𝛼
+ 1] (17) 
 
X2 is increasing in 𝜆𝐻 again, but at the same time decreasing in 𝜆𝑀. In other words, the two 
loss aversion coefficients are opposing forces in determining X2 and the qualitative effect of 
loss aversion on X2 will therefore depend on the relative values of 𝜆𝐻 and 𝜆𝑀. Consequently, 
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the estimate of α (Eq. 5) is expected to be smaller in TTO2 than in TTO1. Since α is 
predicted to be an underestimation in TTO1, this underestimation would then be even smaller 
in TTO2, perhaps changing into an overestimation if λ𝐻 is high enough. We therefore 
formulate the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (TTO1 vs. TTO2): α1<α2. 
 
 Finally, incorporating sign-dependence into the additive model gives the beneath 
expression for X2, which is increasing in λ𝐻 and decreasing in λ𝑀, yielding the same 
predictions as for the multiplicative model: 
 
𝑋2 =
10×[(Q×WTP(YFH))(1+λ𝐻)+S(1+λ𝑀)−λ𝑀C]
(Q×WTP(YFH))(1+λ𝐻)+C
. (18) 
 
  
2.2.3. QTO  
A third possibility to elicit MVQ is a new variation to the common TTO for income 
procedure: the Quality Trade Off (QTO). This procedure varies QoL instead of life duration. 
Suppose we apply QTO with T=10 years in full health, YA=C and YB=L (with L>C), and we 
ask for the QoL score X3 with T=10 years in income L rendering indifference. Health status 
is described on a 10-point scale, with 10 representing perfect health and 0 a health state as 
bad as death. If there is no reference-dependency, this indifference can again be evaluated by 
Eq.3, yielding: 
 
10 × 10 ×𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝑌𝐹𝐻) × 𝐶𝛼 = 10 × 𝑋3 ×𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝑌𝐹𝐻) × 𝐿
𝛼 (19) 
𝛼 =
ln(10)−ln(𝑋3)
ln(𝐿)−ln⁡(𝐶)
 (20) 
 
Because according to the QALY model T and Q are fully exchangeable, meaning that living 
10 years with QoL 9 is equivalent to living 9 years with QoL 10, solving Eq. 19 for 
WTP(YFH) yields the same result as Eq. 7. Therefore, this model predicts WTP and α to be 
the same in TTO1 and QTO. In other words X1 is predicted to be equal to X3. 
 If prospect theory holds instead, respondents have to trade off a gain in income 
against a loss in QoL. Assuming {10 years in full health, C} to be the reference point, this 
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again involves comparing the status quo against a mixed prospect, which under the 
multiplicative model would be represented by: 
 
10 × 10 × 𝐶𝛼 = 10 × 10 × [𝑋3 − λ𝑄(1 − 𝑋3)] × 𝐿
𝛼 (21) 
 
This expression can be solved for X3: 
 
𝑋3 =
10
1+𝜆𝑄
[𝜆𝑄 + (
𝐶
𝐿
)
𝛼
], (22) 
 
Comparing (22) to (13), it becomes evident that X1 and X3 are expected to differ only to the 
extent that loss aversion for QoL differs from loss aversion for life duration. 
 Under the additive model, reference-dependence gives: 
 
10 × 10 ×𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝑌𝐹𝐻) + 10 × 𝐶 = 10 × [𝑋3 − λ𝑄(1 − 𝑋3)] ×𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝑌𝐹𝐻) + 10 × 𝐿 (23) 
 
Solving Eq. 23 for X3 gives: 
 
𝑋3 = 10 × (1 −
𝐿−𝐶
(𝑊𝑇𝑃(𝑌𝐹𝐻))(1+λ𝑄)
), (24) 
 
which is again increasing in λ𝑄. 
 It is not clear beforehand whether loss aversion is stronger for life duration or for 
QoL. Intuitively, people may be more reluctant to give up lifetime, which would translate 
into more loss aversion for life duration than for QoL, but no firm evidence is available on 
this point. Consequently, our second hypothesis is the following: 
 
Hypothesis 2 (TTO1 vs. QTO): 𝛌𝐇=𝛌𝐐. We will test this hypothesis by comparing X1 and 
X3, which are predicted to be equal if λH=λQ, as derived earlier. 
 
3. Experiment 
 
3.1. Subjects and income levels 
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A total of 550 subjects representative for the Dutch adult population in terms of 
gender, age and level of education participated in the experiment. The study presented here 
was part of a larger experiment that included two other studies. 
Before the experiment started, subjects were among others asked for: their current net 
household income (called C hereafter), the net monthly income that would be sufficient to 
just make ends meet while staying in their current house (subsistence income, called S 
hereafter), and the net monthly income they would need to be able to live a comfortable life 
without any worries (luxury income, called L hereafter). 
 
3.2. Stimuli 
 
3.2.1. TTO1 
In TTO1, respondents were asked to choose to live T=10 more years in their current 
health state and their current monthly salary, multiplied by 12 to get yearly income YA=C, or 
to live an amount 𝑋1≤10 years in their current health state Q (as measured by a visual 
analogue scale in the beginning of the experiment) but with a higher income (YB=L).  
 
TTO1: Trading years to achieve an income gain in current health  
Suppose you can choose between the following two options. 
Option A.  
“You live for 10 years in your current health state with a net monthly income of [C/12], without any 
changes to it. Then you die.” 
Option B. 
“You live for X years in your current health state with a net monthly income of [L/12], without any 
changes to it. Then you die.” 
 
Hence, TTO1 elicited the number of life years 𝑋1such that the subject would be indifferent 
between (10 years, C) and (𝑋1 years, L), which gives the estimates of α and WTP according 
to Eq.5 and Eq.7 under the multiplicative model and according to Eq.9 under the additive 
model with X=⁡𝑋1. 
 
3.2.2. TTO2 
TTO2 was as explained at the end of the previous section, YA= S. 
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TTO 2: Trading years to achieve an income gain in current health  
Suppose you can choose between the following two options. 
Option A.  
“You live for 10 years in your current health state with a net monthly income of [S/12], without any 
changes to it. Then you die.” 
Option B. 
“You live for X years in your current health state with a net monthly income of [C/12], without any 
changes to it. Then you die.” 
 
TTO2 gives the estimates of α and WTP for the multiplicative [additive] model as provided 
in Eqs. 5 and 7 [9] again, with YA=S, YB=C, and X=X2. 
 
3.2.3. QTO 
 For income we again used current income C and luxury income L, whereas we used 
10 years of life in both options.  
 
QTO: Trading quality to achieve an income gain during 10 remaining years.  
Suppose you can choose between the following two options. 
Option A.  
“You live for 10 years in perfect health state (10 on a scale of 0 to 10) with a net monthly income of 
[C/12], without any changes to it. Then you die.” 
Option B. 
“You live for 10 years in moderate health (X on a scale of 0 to 10) with a net monthly income of 
[L/12], without any changes to it. Then you die.” 
 
3.3. Procedure 
In the first choice, X was always equal to 10 years (life duration part)/QoL points 
(QoL part). Because monotonicity implies dominance of Option B in this situation, we would 
expect respondents to opt for B here. In case one chose A, we asked whether they really 
preferred 10 years with C to 10 years with L. If so, they received the next question and a 
missing value was stored for them. Otherwise, they received the original question anew. If 
respondents were indifferent, a value of 10 was saved. If B was chosen, X was randomly 
lowered to 3, 5, or 7 years/QoL points. The respondent could then choose A or B again or 
express indifference. In case of indifference, the provided value of X was the elicited 
indifference point. If A or B was chosen, the respondent had to indicate the value of X such 
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that A and B were equally attractive to them by using a scroll bar, where the range of the 
scroll bar was censored by the previous choice. For example, if the respondent received X=3 
in the second choice and then opted for A, the scroll bar was censored between 3 and 10, 
whereas it was between 0 and 3 if they opted for B. 
The experiment was conducted by a professional internet sampling company (Survey 
Sampling International). This company has much experience with internet surveys and a 
large representative database of subjects. The subjects were rewarded with a small monetary 
amount to be given to a charity fund of their choice, upon completion of the questionnaire. 
 Income was measured on a categorical scale (with “€999 or less” as lowest category, 
“€8,000 or more” as highest category, and eleven €500 intervals in-between). We used the 
midpoint of the chosen scale as the amount to be used in TTO questions. Whenever someone 
expressed subsistence income to be above current income, or luxury income below current 
income, we replaced these values in the TTO questions in order to enable sensible trade-offs. 
In particular, S was replaced by half of current income and L was replaced by twice the 
amount of current income. 
 
3.4. Analysis 
As pointed out by Gyrd-Hansen and Kjær (2012), there tends to be a lot of 
heterogeneity in WTP for a QALY estimates. They demonstrate that, because of this 
heterogeneity, the choice of the analytical approach can make for a large difference in WTP 
estimates. In particular, they summed the individual WTP estimates and divided this amount 
by the sum of the considered QALY gains (aggregated approach or ‘ratio of means’). They 
compared this approach to the disaggregated approach (‘mean of ratios’), where they divided 
the WTP by the associated QALY gain for each individual separately, and observed large 
differences. In the disaggregated approach, it was not possible to include non-traders, because 
their QALY gain was zero. In our case, the aggregated approach means a division of the sum 
of the income differences by the sum of the life time reductions. The disaggregated approach 
instead implies a division of the income difference by the reduction of life time for each 
respondent. These approaches are also likely to generate different results, especially because 
we have a lot of non-traders, who could be included in the aggregated approach, but not in 
the disaggregated approach. 
We compared the individual WTPs in the disaggregated approach by means of a 
nonparametric Wilcoxon signed ranks test (a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicated that the 
WTP estimates were not normally distributed, p<0.01). For TTO1 [TTO2, QTO], 247 [180, 
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148] non-traders had to be excluded from this analysis. Two respondents who had a 
subsistence income level of S=0 were also excluded, because α could not be computed for 
them. Finally, respondents who traded off all available life years had to be excluded since 
these people would have no life time left (1 in TTO1, 8 in TTO2, and 2 in QTO). 
 
4. Results 
 
Table 1 presents some demographic variables of our sample. These numbers indicate 
representativeness for the Dutch adult population according to age, gender and education. 
  
Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
 
Variable Percentage Mean SD Minimum Maximum 
Age  45.6 15.02 18 75 
Gender (% male) 49.3     
Children (%yes) 57.5     
Number of children 
(among people with 
children, n=316) 
 2.22  1 21 
Income groups:      
<€1000 14.0     
€1000-<€2000 37.1     
€2000-<€3000 28.9     
€3000-<€4000 13.3     
>€3999 6.7     
Education:      
Lower 28.6     
Middle 41.6     
Higher 29.8     
Health status      
EQ-5D (Dutch 
tariff) 
 0.82 0.21 -0.329 1 
VAS  76.75 17.75 9 100 
Completion time (mins.)  16.1 6.2 5 44.9 
 
 
Table 2 classifies the respondents in different groups: non-traders, over-traders 
(causing a negative WTP) and respondents with zero WTP. Row F shows the net sample size 
for each method. Rows G and H display the mean number of years [QoL] given up in TTO1 
and TTO2 [QTO]. These numbers indicate that respondents sacrifice more years in TTO2 
than in TTO1, and that the relative sacrifice is similar for TTO2 and QTO. Furthermore, a 
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high number of non-traders appeared in all three tasks. These respondents may be viewed as 
people who “are not willing to play the game”. 
 
Table 2. Overview 
  WTP1  
(L-C) 
WTP2  
(C-S) 
WTP3  
(L-C QoL) 
A Non-traders 247 180 148 
B Negative WTP 
77 111 
0 (add) 
151 (mul) 
C Subjects trading off all years/quality 1 8 2 
D Zero WTP 12 59 0 
E S=0  2  
F Net sample size (550-A-C) 302 360 400 
G Mean years/QoL given up (incl. non-traders) 1.96 2.81 28.6% 
H Mean years/QoL given up (excl. non-traders) 3.56 4.21 39.2% 
 
Table 3 presents the WTP estimates under the assumption of the additive model. The 
observation of Table 2 of more life years given up to move from a subsistence income to their 
current income, than to move from their current income to a luxury income, clearly translates 
into a lower WTP estimate in the former task than the latter. In addition, the substantial 
number of over-traders results in a negative WTP in the additive model, explaining the low 
median WTP. 
 
Table 3. WTP estimates additive model 
 WTP1  
(L-C) 
WTP2  
(–C-S) 
WTP3  
(L-C QoL) 
Mean (disaggregated approach) 234,465 55,641 132,322 
Median (disaggregated approach) 20,563 3,542 42,000 
WTP using means (incl. non-traders) (aggregated 
approach) 
117,611 16,916 98,708 
Mean trimmed data (5% upper and 5% lower) 
(disaggregated approach) 
78,629 13,377 77,114 
Median trimmed data (disaggregated approach) 20,563 3,875 42,000 
WTP using means trimmed data (aggregated 
approach) 
86,518 17,833 71,493 
WTP using medians trimmed data (aggregated 
approach) 
401,250 5,000 62,069 
 
Table 4 gives the estimates obtained under the multiplicative model. This table shows 
a similar pattern across methods, but at the same time the estimates differ substantially from 
those of the additive model. In particular, the means explode when estimating the 
multiplicative model, due to some outliers. These are less influential in the aggregated 
approach, giving much more conservative estimates there. Moreover, the medians are less 
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vulnerable to outliers than the means; they are even lower when fitting the multiplicative 
model than when fitting the additive model. In order to remove the inflating effect of the 
outliers, we also analyzed the data using a trimmed dataset, where we removed the 5% 
highest and 5% lowest WTP ratios. In general, both models generate considerably higher 
means than medians, indicative of a high degree of skewness, which is common in WTP 
studies (Smith, 2001; Stewart et al., 2002).  
 
Table 4. WTP estimates multiplicative model 
 
 α1 WTP1  
(L-C) 
α2 WTP2  
(C-S) 
α3 WTP3 
 (L-C QoL) 
Mean (disaggregated approach) 1.01 7,82e14 1.12 2,931,121 1.25 1,985,200 
Median (disaggregated approach) 0.62 14,969 0.86 2,604 0.79 4,060 
WTP using means (aggregated 
approach) 
0.29 96,503 0.60 14,072 0.46 34,564 
Mean trimmed data (5% upper and 
5% lower) (disaggregated approach) 
 87,328  11,596  28,675 
Median trimmed data (disaggregated 
approach) 
 14,969  2,254  4,061 
WTP using means trimmed data 
(aggregated approach) 
0.33 75,288 0.57 14,807 0.55 22,340 
WTP using medians trimmed data 
(aggregated approach) 
0.08 580,061 0.81 4,299 0.55 18,648 
  
 
The formal tests of our hypotheses give the following results. 
 
Hypothesis 1. We observe α1 to be significantly lower than α2 (p<0.01), which is consistent 
with our prediction resulting from loss aversion. Related to this finding, the estimated WTP is 
significantly higher for TTO1 than for TTO2 under both the additive and the multiplicative 
model (p<0.01), indicating individuals are willing to give up more lifetime to move from a 
subsistence income to current income, than to move from their current income to a luxury 
income. 
 
Hypothesis 2. X1 is significantly higher than X3 (p<0.01), indicating that loss aversion is 
stronger for life duration than for QoL. 
 
5. Discussion 
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This research set out to explore a novel method to value life years by means of trading life 
years for income. We applied three different procedures to elicit WTP with this method under 
different assumptions about the utility functions for health and money. Our trimmed WTP 
estimates give numbers that are comparable to estimates found in the literature (Mason et al., 
2009; Pinto-Prades et al., 2009; Shiroiwa et al., 2013), although the high variation across 
procedures indicates a high susceptibility to the particular procedure employed. Likewise, the 
differences between models show the large influence of the particular assumptions about the 
utility functions for life duration and consumption on WTP estimates. Regarding the former, 
we find a difference in WTP between two procedures in the direction predicted by prospect 
theory. Furthermore, we observe significantly less non-trading when using QoL instead of 
life duration as response scale, although this does not necessarily translate into higher WTP 
for a healthy life year. 
 Regarding the additive model, the mean number of traded life years and the WTP 
estimates in TTO2 were comparable to those reported by Tilling et al. (2014) (their TTO1), 
who used the same method2. However, our WTP estimates were higher in TTO1 (their 
TTO2). One difference in the designs that the higher and lower income values were 
determined by the respondents themselves in our study, whereas these values were given by 
the experimenters in Tilling et al. (2014). Another difference was that we asked respondents 
to consider living their remaining lifetime in their current health state, while Tilling et al. 
(2014) instructed respondents to assume to spend the remaining lifetime in full health. 
Although we corrected for the respondents’ own health by taking their VAS score into 
account, this may nevertheless have caused differences. Finally, Tilling et al. (2014) used a 
direct matching procedure, whereas we employed a combination of bisection and matching. 
However, these differences hold for both versions, so it is not evident why we only observe 
higher WTP values for the gain version. 
One of the limitations of this study was the high number of non-traders.  Non-
willingness to trade may be a sincere preference or an expression of protest against the nature 
of the exercise, but part of it may be the result of the magnitude of our trade unit. The 
minimum amount to be traded was 0.1 years, so if people were only prepared to sacrifice, 
say, 2 days, 0 was closer to this amount than 0.1 years. These respondents would then appear 
to have an infinite WTP, whereas in reality their WTP is finite (albeit high). 
                                               
2 However, they only estimated the additive model, so our comparisons only concerns that model. 
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Although many respondents did not trade at all, only about 25% of these non-traders 
expressed indifference between 10 years with the lower income and 10 years with the higher 
income, which would be the implication of non-trading. The other 75% preferred 10 years 
with the higher income, but picked the highest possible answer in the slider (i.e., 10 years 
with the higher income). Hence, it seems these respondents had some other reason to refuse 
any trading than being indifferent between earning a lower or a higher income. Explanations 
may be that they attempted to ‘improve their position’ or because their indifference value was 
between 9.9 and 10, which could not be expressed in our questionnaire. Future research may 
therefore experiment with other designs such as only presenting binary choices or not 
applying sliders. 
The difference in non-trading behaviour between TTO1 and TTO2 may also have been 
caused by the amount of difference between current and luxury income, versus the difference 
between subsistence and current income, which of course differed between subjects. The 
former difference was higher on average than the latter. Consequently, respondents were more 
likely to give up lifetime in the current-luxury trade-off than in the subsistence-current trade-
off.  
A second limitation was that a substantial part of the respondents trade too many life 
years, causing negative WTP for a life year. This finding may be caused by respondents not 
seriously engaging in or comprehending the task (despite our explanation of the fact that their 
answer implies their total income will be lower and their life span shorter), but also to a 
sincere preference for a high income per period. Obviously, a negative WTP is nonsensical, 
as it implies these people would not want to live an additional year in full health even if it 
would cost them no money at all. However, a possible rationalization for this behavior might 
be that individuals derive such a high amount of utility from having a high income per month 
that they prefer a short life with a high monthly income over a longer life with more total 
income but a lower monthly income. This argument would translate into a composite utility 
function that incorporates utility of income instead of utility of wealth. More research is 
required to sort out this question. 
Third, our results reveal that respondents tend to pick the highest amount of the range 
in the scroll bar question, resulting in a multi-peaked answer distribution. This observation 
points toward some kind of preference construction, where respondents are influenced by the 
initial question. That is, they may be subject to an anchoring bias, as reported earlier in TTO 
and WTP studies (Samuelsen et al., 2012; Ternent and Tsuchiya, 2013; van Exel et al., 2006). 
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Furthermore, their indifference value may not necessarily represent a true indifference, but 
instead a wish of subjects to improve their position. 
Fourth, the TTO2 and QTO versions generated significantly fewer respondents who 
were indifferent between 10 years with income L [C] and 10 years with income C [S], or who 
even preferred the latter to the former option, than the TTO1 version. Given that TTO2 and 
QTO were always asked after TTO1, this finding could be due to a learning effect. Future 
research randomizing the order of these tasks is needed to test this possibility. 
Notwithstanding these shortcomings, several conclusions and areas for future research 
emerge from our experiment. First, WTP is sensitive to both the amount of the income 
compared and to the currency used to trade off health for money (i.e. duration or QoL). 
Second, large differences in WTP result from making different assumptions regarding the 
lifetime utility function, stressing the need to obtain a valid measurement of the parametric 
shape of this function. Third, the high numbers of infinite and negative WTP estimates 
indicate that the investigated procedure also has drawbacks (like common WTP approaches). 
The presence of non-traders is inherent to the WTP and TTO approaches in general and hard 
to resolve. The presence of over-traders is specific to the current method. 
 Our findings were consistent with Hypothesis 1 (i.e., α1<α2), but loss aversion need 
not be the only reason for this. One other possibility would be that the multiplicative model is 
valid but that it needs to be accompanied by a nonlinear utility function over life years 
(Abellán-Perpinán et al., 2006; Attema et al., 2012; Bleichrodt and Pinto, 2005; Wakker and 
Deneffe, 1996). For instance, if individuals discount the future, this reflects a concave utility 
of life duration function (e.g. a power function with power smaller than 1). The power 
estimates of the utility function over income may turn out to be constant across questions if 
we allow for such a generalisation, indicating our rejection is due to an invalid assumption 
regarding the utility of life duration. This emphasizes the importance of controlling for both 
utility functions. In addition, the multiplicative model may be valid with a linear utility of life 
duration, but with the utility function for income having another parametric shape than one 
belonging to the power family. Its shape may instead be exponential, reflecting constant 
absolute risk aversion instead of constant relative risk aversion. However, applying an 
exponential function is more elaborative as it does not give an analytical solution for the 
exponent and has to be solved numerically for each respondent. In sum, our findings do 
neither necessarily reject the multiplicative or additive shapes of the utility of health and 
wealth, nor do they necessarily imply the presence of loss aversion; they only indicate that it 
is inappropriate to model the responses by a combination of a linear utility of life duration 
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function, a power function of wealth, and the assumption of no loss aversion. Further 
research is required to test which parametric shape best fits lifetime preferences and whether 
assuming prospect theory causes an improvement in the descriptive validity of individual 
behavior.  
 The significant difference between X1, the answer to TTO1, and X3, the answer to 
QTO, rejects Hypothesis 2 (i.e., λH=λQ), and implies a violation of the QALY model. The 
sign of the difference implies more loss aversion with respect to life duration than with 
respect to QoL. This finding is consistent with the tendency of people to refuse trading off 
life years in classical TTO (Arnesen and Trommald, 2005). However, WTP is only higher for 
TTO1 than QTO under the additive model; in fact, WTP is significantly lower for TTO1 than 
for QTO when assuming the multiplicative model. The major reason for these contradictory 
findings seems to be the large number of respondents with negative WTP: for QTO, negative 
WTP was only possible under the multiplicative model, but not under the additive model, 
resulting in much lower median WTP estimates under the multiplicative model for this 
procedure. This highlights the importance of the underlying lifetime utility function. 
 This research clearly has an explorative character. Nevertheless, given the existing 
methodological problems with traditional WTP, new approaches should be developed and 
explored. Furthermore, as described earlier in this discussion, our results open up several new 
and important areas for future research. 
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Appendix – Mathematical derivations 
 
Estimation of α in TTO1 in case of loss aversion: 
 
10 × 𝑄 × 𝐶𝛼 = [𝑋1 − 𝜆𝐻(10 − 𝑋1)] × 𝑄 × 𝐿
𝛼 
 
(
𝐶
𝐿
)
𝛼
=
𝑋1 − (10 − 𝑋1)𝜆𝐻
10
⇔ (
𝐶
𝐿
)
𝛼
=
𝑋1(1 + 𝜆𝐻)
10
+ 𝜆𝐻⇔𝛼 =
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑋1(1 + 𝜆𝐻)
10 + 𝜆𝐻)
ln(𝐶) − ln⁡(𝐿)
 
 
Estimation of α in TTO2 in case of loss aversion: 
 
10 × 𝑄 × [𝑆 − 𝜆𝑀(𝐶 − 𝑆)]
𝛼 = [𝑋2 − 𝜆𝐻(10 − 𝑋2)] × 𝑄 × 𝐶
𝛼 
 
(
(1 + 𝜆𝑀)𝑆 − 𝐶𝜆𝑀
𝐶
)
𝛼
=
𝑋2 − (10 − 𝑋2)𝜆𝐻
10
⇔ (
(1 + 𝜆𝑀)𝑆 − 𝐶𝜆𝑀
𝐶
)
𝛼
=
(1 + 𝜆𝐻)𝑋2 − 10𝜆𝐻
10
⇔ (
(1 + 𝜆𝑀)𝑆
𝐶
− 𝜆𝑀)
𝛼
=
(1 + 𝜆𝐻)𝑋2
10
− 𝜆𝐻⇔𝛼
=
𝑙𝑛 (
(1 + 𝜆𝐻)𝑋2
10 − 𝜆𝐻)
𝑙𝑛 (
(1 + 𝜆𝑀)𝑆
𝐶 − 𝜆𝑀)
 
 
Estimation of α in QTO in case of loss aversion: 
 
10 × 𝑄 × 𝐶𝛼 = 10 × [
𝑋3
10
− λ𝑄(1 −
𝑋3
10
)] × 𝑄 × 𝐿𝛼  
(
𝐶
𝐿
)
𝛼
=
𝑋3 − (10 − 𝑋3)𝜆𝑄
10
⇔ (
𝐶
𝐿
)
𝛼
=
𝑋3(1 + 𝜆𝑄)
10
+ 𝜆𝑄⇔𝛼 =
𝑙𝑛 (
𝑋3(1 + 𝜆𝑄)
10 + 𝜆𝑄)
ln(𝐶) − ln⁡(𝐿)
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